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Abstract. We study a class of voting rules that bridge between
majoritarianism and liberalism. An outcome of the vote speciﬁes
who among the voters are eligible to a certain right or qualiﬁcation.
Each outcome serves also as a permissible ballot. We characterize
axiomatically a family of rules parameterized by the weight each in-
dividual has in determining his or her qualiﬁcation. In one extreme
case, the Liberal Rule, each individual’s qualiﬁcation is determined
by her. In the other, an individual’s qualiﬁcation is determined by
a majority. We also propose a formalization of self-determination,
and apply it in a characterization of the Liberal Rule.
1. Introduction
1.1. Liberalism and democracy. The liberal and the democratic
principles dominate modern political thought. The ﬁrst requires that
decisions on certain matters rest with the individual and not with so-
ciety. The second assigns the power of decision making to majorities.
The question of the right balance between these two principles is an
ongoing subject of debate in the public at large and among students
of political thought. An eﬀort is continually made to draw the line be-
tween the domains in which each principle applies: when the majority
is justiﬁed in becoming involved in an individual’s aﬀairs, and when
the person is allowed to make the decision alone.
Thus, for example, it is acceptable nowadays in liberal democracies
that questions regarding the reading of certain books should not be
decided by a majority of any form, and should be left to each indi-
vidual’s discretion. It is also obvious, that although all citizens have
the same political rights, the question who holds the highest political
position (say the president) is decided, roughly speaking, by a simple
majority. But in between these two extreme cases—the majoritarian
rule, and the liberal rule—there are decisions, concerning an individ-
ual, that on the one hand do not require a majority, and on the other
are not determined by the individual either. Consider, for example, the
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right to be a candidate for the top position in society, or some other
political position. Exercising such a right by an individual is usually
not up to him or her. But one does not need a majority decision to be
included on the list of candidates; in most liberal democratic regimes
one needs only a relatively small group of supporters to be considered
as a candidate.
It is our purpose here to study and characterize, in the framework of
a social choice model, a family of social procedures, called here Liberal-
Democratic rules, that lie between the majoritarian and liberal rules.
The dichotomy between liberalism and democracy has been much dis-
cussed and debated in liberal thought since its conception. Liberalism
and majoritarianism, separately, have also been extensively studied in
the social choice literature. But as far is we know, presenting them as
the extremes of a whole spectrum of rules is new.
1.2. The model. In order to study the relation between the liberal
and the majoritarian rules in the same model, we follow a recent work
by Kasher and Rubinstein (1998) who studied group identiﬁcation. We
present the model against the background of the ﬁrst and most familiar
social choice model of liberalism introduced in Sen’s pioneering work,
Sen (1970). Sen studied liberalism in terms of Arrow’s social choice
functions, Arrow (1951). Such a function maps any proﬁle of preference
orders of individuals to a social preference order. An individual is said
to be decisive on two alternatives, for a given social choice function, if
the function orders these alternatives in the same way as the individual
does. Sen’s minimal liberalism axiom requires, that there are at least
two individuals each of which is decisive on two alternatives. He shows,
then, that this axiom contradicts Pareto optimality, referring to this
contradiction as the Liberal Paradox.
The following three features of Sen’s framework should be empha-
sized.
• Social alternatives, like in Arrow’s model, are primitives of the
theory. The decisiveness of an individual over alternatives is given
exogenously, and nothing in the structure of the alternatives ex-
presses its relation to the individual.
• Social ordering is a function of the real preference order of indi-
viduals. The mechanism that is used to select an alternative is
disregarded.
• Liberalism is deﬁned as the ability of an individual to guarantee
that his preference over certain outcomes prevails, as opposed to
the ability to guarantee a certain subset of the outcomes them-
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Many social choice models of liberalism diﬀer from that of Sen on
these points. The model used here diﬀers in each of them. First of
all, social alternatives here are structured. More speciﬁcally, each al-
ternative is a subset of individuals. Although, as we said, no such
structure exists in Sen’s framework, the example he used to illustrate
the Liberal Paradox can be interpreted as having this structure. In
this example society has to decide who of its members is allowed to
read Lady Chatterley’s Lover. Obviously, an answer to this question,
that is, the social alternative chosen, would be a subset of society. Like
in Sen’s example we study one right at a time. Social alternatives are
subsets of individuals, where each subset is interpreted as the group of
individuals eligible to the said right.
Second, unlike Sen, we do not study social choice functions. We
study, instead, a voting rule, in which each individual proposes a subset
of individuals, and given the proﬁle of the proposed subsets, the rule
determines the eligible individuals.
Finally, liberalism is deﬁned here as the ability of an individual to
guarantee certain aspects of the outcomes. If we think of a voting
rule as a game form in which the various ballots are the strategies of
each individual, then liberalism means here that each individual has
a strategy that enables her to determine certain aspects of the social
outcome. This variant of liberalism says, in the example above, that the
question of whether an individual reads a certain book or does not, can
be determined by her, by choosing appropriate ballots, irrespective of
others’ ballots. Preferences over outcomes play no role in this deﬁnition
of liberalism.
The model studied here, can be used in problems other than the
endowments of rights on issues that are considered private and personal
matter. For example, the right to drive a car in the public domain.
It can also be applied to procedures of elections. Thus, when it is
required to compose an agreed upon list of candidates for the election
of a dean, it is natural to ask faculty members to propose each a list
and then apply some aggregating rule to form a ﬁnal list. In Kasher
and Rubinstein (1998),the model is applied to the problem of socially
deﬁning the extension of a given nationality. Similarly, we can use
such models in order to socially deﬁne who are the poor individuals in
society, or even who are the tall people.
The feature common to all these problems is that a certain qualiﬁca-
tion of persons is considered. Any group of individuals is a candidate,
or an alternative, for a speciﬁcation of the qualiﬁed individuals. The
qualiﬁcations, as demonstrated by all these examples, may have a sig-
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concerning who is qualiﬁed. Therefore a rule needs to be found, that
transforms the various views concerning qualiﬁcation into a socially
deﬁned group of qualiﬁed individuals.
1.3. The main result. We consider four axioms, which in one form
or another are very standard in theories of social choice. The special
twist of the rules that are characterized by these axiom stems from the
particular feature of the model, where alternatives are subsets of the
individuals.
The ﬁrst axiom requires monotonicity. Consider the qualiﬁcation of
individuals as either tall and handsome (qualiﬁcation a) or just tall
(qualiﬁcation b). Individuals may disagree on who is qualiﬁed as a or
as b. But obviously, it is unanimously agreed that being qualiﬁed as a,
implies being qualiﬁes as b. The axiom requires that this unanimous
agreement is reﬂected in the social deﬁnition of qualiﬁcation. That
is, all persons who are socially qualiﬁed as a, must also be socially
qualiﬁed as b.
Next we require independence. The social qualiﬁcation of an individ-
ual should depend only on the views held by all individuals concerning
this individual and not others.
The data required to distinguish between qualiﬁed individuals and
unqualiﬁed ones, come in two forms. Individuals can specify their
opinions about either who is qualiﬁed, or who is not. The Duality
axiom requires that applying the rule to either data results in the same
distinction.
Finally, the Symmetry axiom requires that a rule does not depend
on the names of individuals.
It is not surprising that these axioms are related to Majority Rules.
Similar axioms characterize Majority Rules in various models. It is
somewhat less obvious that these axioms characterize a family of rules
which are a mixture of a Majority Rule and a Liberal Rule. We call the
rules that satisfy the four axioms Liberal-Democratic Rules. This family
of rules is parameterized by the support s, which is an integer that does
not exceed half of the population size by more than 1. According to
the rule with parameter s, one’s characterization of oneself, whether
qualiﬁed or not, is adopted by society if there are at least s − 1 other
individuals who agree with it. Otherwise, the majority of individuals
who do not agree with one’s qualiﬁcation of oneself have the say.
The two extreme values of s give rise to rules which express the two
principles in their purest form. When s = 1, one’s qualiﬁcation of
oneself is accepted by society. This is the Liberal Rule. When s takes
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is determined by a Majority Rule which depends on the parity of the
population size n. When n is odd, then the social qualiﬁcation of an
individual is determined by a simple majority of all opinions concerning
her qualiﬁcation. For even n, the largest value of s is n/2+1, and in this
case an individual’s qualiﬁcation is determined by a simple majority of
all individuals other than her.
The Liberal Rule was characterized axiomatically by Kasher and
Rubinstein (1998). One of their axioms, which they call the Liberal
axiom, requires that individuals can force certain outcomes. It says
that if there is an individual who considers herself qualiﬁed, then there
must be someone who is socially qualiﬁed, and if there is an individual
who considers herself unqualiﬁed, then there must be someone who is
socially unqualiﬁed. Thus, the special status of one’s qualiﬁcation of
oneself is stated explicitly in the Liberal axiom. In our model, none of
the axioms requires explicitly, neither that individuals has any power
to determine certain outcomes, nor that one’s qualiﬁcation of oneself
is more signiﬁcant than others’ qualiﬁcation of one. The emergence of
the weight given to one’s qualiﬁcation of oneself, in our model, depends
on the combination of all four axioms. But we would like to highlight
the role of the Symmetry axiom with this respect.
Symmetry of any object refers to the transformations of that object
that leave it the same. Indeed, symmetry deﬁnes, sameness. It deﬁnes
what is essential to the object and what is not. Social symmetries
deﬁne the meaningful features of society. In our model, the Symmetry
axiom says that the naming of individuals is insigniﬁcant. And as
rules are expressed in terms of names, this means that individuals are
indistinguishable, which reﬂects the idea of equality that underlies the
democratic principle. However as social alternatives in our model are
subsets of individuals, the Symmetry axiom says more. It allows name
swapping only as long the same permutation is carried out both for
the individuals as voters, and as elements of the social alternatives.
Thus, breaking the linkage between an individual and a certain issue
is not allowed by the symmetry axiom, or in other words, the axiom
allows such a linkage to be socially meaningful. In some cases this
linkage seems to be necessary. Suppose, for example that the issue
is the reading of book X. If Adam changes his name to Barry, then
Adam’s reading book X, now becomes Barry’s reading it. The linkage
between one and one’s reading X cannot be broken. This sounds almost
tautological: it is impossible to think of my reading of a certain book
as an issue which in some transformation of society is not linked to
me, let alone linked to someone else. But the linkage between me and
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can easily think about transformation of the societal environment in
which my apple is no longer mine. Indeed, some of the arguments
made to justify property rights try to establish a logical link between
individuals and the objects over which they have property rights. Thus,
for example, Locke’s argument is based on the work and eﬀorts invested
by the individuals in their property.
Our result seems to indicate, then, that rights are not necessarily
primitive notions. Rights can be based, among other things, on the
more primitive assumption that certain linkages between individuals
and issues are considered socially meaningful and relevant. This as-
sumption is more primitive, since it does not say how these meaningful
linkages should be reckoned with: they can be liabilities, for example,
rather than rights.
1.4. Related works. Structuring social alternatives, in order to study
the liberal paradox, was proposed by Gibbard (1973a). Each individ-
ual, in his model, is associated with certain issues. An issue can be
the color of John’s shirt, or whether Marry reads book X. A social al-
ternative speciﬁes how all issues are resolved. Gibbard’s liberal axiom
requires that an individual should be decisive on any two alternatives
that diﬀer on only one issue which is associated with that individual.
The alternatives in our model can viewed as a special case of Gibbard’s.
For each individual there is one issue, which can be resolved in one of
two ways: it is the question whether or not the individual is qualiﬁed.
Gibbard shows that there can be no social choice function that satis-
ﬁes the liberal axiom. In contrast, in our model, where liberalism is
outcome based, liberal rules obviously exist; these are the simple rules
which allow individuals to resolve the issues related to them as they
wish.
The procedural, game theoretic, aspects of social choice were ﬁrst
studied by Farquharson (1969). He characterized families of voting
procedures axiomatically and analyzed their game theoretic aspects.
Gibbard’s manipulability result, Gibbard (1973b), further highlighted
these game theoretic aspects.
Barbera et al. (1991) studied voting procedures in which the subsets
of some ﬁxed ﬁnite set serve both as the alternatives voted for, and as
the ballots. The model here is a special case where this ﬁnite set is the
set of individuals. They characterize the rules of voting by committees
as those rules which are strategy-proof and satisfy voter sovereignty
over separable preferences. In our terminology, voting by committees
are rules that satisfy Monotonicity and Independence.BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 7
The distinction between the two variants of liberalism, preference
based and outcome based, has been discussed by many authors. Nozick
(1974) criticized Sen’s preference based liberalism. G¨ ardenfors (1981)
formalized outcome based liberalism by a game theoretic model. Liber-
alism as it is understood here corresponds to the notion of dichotomous
veto power in Deb et al. (1997). A deﬁnition of liberalism, applied to a
game forms, is discussed in Riley (1989). There, a voting rule is said to
be liberal if for every proﬁle of preferences there exists a strategic equi-
librium in pure strategies. Following this reasoning, a Liberal Paradox
occurs if for some proﬁle every strategic equilibrium is not eﬃcient. Ri-
ley uses the concept of strong equilibrium instead of eﬃcient strategic
equilibrium.
2. The main characterization
2.1. Preliminaries and notations. Let N = {1,...,n} be a set of
individuals. These individuals are facing the problem of collectively
choosing a certain subset of N, of those individuals who have a certain
qualiﬁcation. The input for this collective choice is the personal views
that individuals have concerning who is qualiﬁed. These views are
summarized by a proﬁle which is an n × n matrix P = (Pij), the
elements of which are 0’s and 1’s. When Pij = 1, we say individual i
qualiﬁes individual j. Thus, row i in the matrix P describes i’s personal
view of the group of qualiﬁed individuals; it is the set {j | Pij = 1}.
Column j tells us who are the individuals i who qualify j.





of 0’s and 1’s, which is the indicator
function of the group of socially qualiﬁed individuals, {j | fj(P) = 1}.
For x ∈ {0,1} we use the standard notation x = 1−x. Accordingly,




. For arrays A and B (matrices or
vectors) of the same dimension we write A ≥ B if this inequality holds
coordinatewise.
2.2. The axioms. Suppose we are interested in socially qualifying
persons who have the right to read book X and persons who have
the right to read all books. Obviously, from each individual’s point of
view, any person who has the right to read all books, has the right to
read X. In terms of the proﬁles P 0 and P which correspond to these
two qualiﬁcations, this is equivalent to saying that P ≥ P 0. We should
expect, then, that every one who is socially qualiﬁed as having the
right to read all books is also socially qualiﬁed as having the right to
read X.
Monotonicity. If P ≥ P 0, then, f(P) ≥ f(P 0).BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 8
We require, next, that the social qualiﬁcation of individual j is inde-
pendent on what individuals think about the qualiﬁcation of individuals
other than i.
Independence. If P and P 0 are proﬁles such that for some j ∈ N,
Pij = P 0
ij for all i ∈ N, then fj(P) = fj(P 0).
Qualiﬁcations come in pairs; an individual is either qualiﬁed as one
who is allowed to read Lay Chatterley’s Lover, or he is qualiﬁed as
one who is not allowed to read it. He is either qualiﬁed as a Jew,
or as a Non-Jew. We can socially qualify persons as Jews by asking
individuals whom they qualify as Jews, or we can socially qualify Non-
Jews by asking individuals to qualify Non-Jews. We require that either
way we arrive at the same distinction between Jews and Non-Jews.
We note that if the proﬁle P describes individuals’ views concerning a
certain qualiﬁcation Q, then the proﬁle P describes the views of the
same individuals concerning the qualiﬁcation non-Q. Our requirement
is expressed then as follows.
Duality. f(P) = f(P).
We require that social qualiﬁcation should not change if individuals
switch their names. Name switching is described by a permutation
π of N. We think of π(i) as the old name of the person whose new
name is i. For a proﬁle P, given in terms of the old names, we denote
by πP the proﬁle after the name switching. To say that i qualiﬁes j,
using the new names, means that the individual whose old name is π(i)
qualiﬁes the person whose old name is π(j). Thus, (πP)ij = Pπ(i)π(j).
The axiom requires that given the proﬁle πP, in terms of the new
names, individual i is socially qualiﬁed, if and only if individual π(i)
was qualiﬁed when the proﬁle was P. Denoting by πf(P) the vector  
fπ(1)(P),...,fπ(n)(P)

, the axiom can be succinctly stated as follows.
Symmetry. For any permutation π of N, f(πP) = πf(P).
2.3. Liberal-Democratic Rules.
Deﬁnition 1. Let s be an integer, such that 1 ≤ s ≤ n/2 + 1. A
Liberal-Democratic Rule with support s is a social rule fs that satisﬁes
for each individual j and proﬁle P,
f
s
j(P) = Pjj if and only if |{i | Pij = Pjj}| ≥ s.
According to the rule fs, j’s view of herself is accepted by society, if
and only if j’s view is shared by at least s individuals (including her).
The support s expresses the importance of an individual’s view of
herself to her social qualiﬁcation; the lower s is, the more inﬂuential isBETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 9
the way individuals perceive themselves. The two extreme values of s
deserve special attention.
We call the rule f1, the Liberal Rule. As the set {i | Pij = Pjj}
always contains j, it follows that for all proﬁles P, f1
j (P) = Pjj. In
other words, j’s social qualiﬁcation is solely determined by him.
The other extreme case is, when s is the largest integer that does not
exceed n/2 + 1. We will show that when n is odd, j’s view of himself
does not have more weight than other’s views, and when n is even his
view does not count at all.
Consider ﬁrst an odd n. The highest value that s can take in this
case is (n + 1)/2, and the rule fs is a Simple Majority Rule in which
j does not have any special role. Indeed, suppose that a majority of
individuals qualify j as x, where x is either 0 or 1. That is, |{i | Pij =
x}| ≥ s. Now, if Pjj = x then fj(P) = x by deﬁnition. If x 6= Pjj, then
|{i | Pij = Pjj}| ≤ n − s < s, and fj(P) = x.
Suppose now that n is even, then s = n/2 + 1. In this case a simple
majority of all individuals other than j (i.e., n/2, or more, out of the
n − 1 individuals) determines his qualiﬁcation. Indeed, suppose that
|{i | Pij = x, i 6= j}| ≥ n/2. If Pjj = x then |{i | Pij = Pjj,}| ≥
n/2+1 = s and fs
j(P) = x. If x 6= Pjj, then |{i | Pij = Pjj}| ≤ n/2 < s,
and again, fs
j(P) = x.
Theorem 1. A social rule satisﬁes the axioms of Monotonicity, In-
dependence, Duality, and Symmetry, if and only if it is a Liberal-
Democratic Rule. Moreover, all four axioms are independent.
3. Self-determination
The political principle of Self-determination says that a group of
people recognized as a nation has the right to form its own state and
choose its own government. One of the main diﬃculties in applying
Self-determination is that it grants the right to exercise sovereignty to
well deﬁned national identities; it assumes that the self is well deﬁned.
In many cases the very distinct national character of the group is under
dispute. Such disputes can be resolved, at least theoretically, by a
voting rule. Here we want to examine rules which grant the self the
right to determine itself. For brevity we refer to this property of voting
rules as Self-Determination and not Determination of the self, despite
the new meaning we give it.
Suppose we want to deﬁne the nationality of Hobbits. On ﬁrst exam-
ination the rquirement that Hobbits determine who Hobbits are seems
to be circular. But this circularity can be avoided in two ways. In the
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non-Hobbits’ opinion about Hobbits and applying again the rule will
result in the same deﬁnition of Hobbits. We call this axiom Exclusive
Self-determination, because it is expressed in terms of excluding non-
Hobbit from those who have the power to deﬁne Hobbits. We call the
second axiom Aﬃrmative Self-determination, because it states directly
the right of Hobbits to deﬁne Hobbits. In order to formulate it we use
the rule f to qualify not only Hobbits, but also deﬁners of Hobbits.
Inclusive Self-determination says that the two groups, of Hobbits and
of deﬁners of Hobbits, should coincide. We show that each of these
axioms combined with three of the previously deﬁned axioms charac-
terize the Liberal Rule. That is, the right of a collective to deﬁne itself
is reduced to the right of each individual to deﬁne herself as part of
this collective.
The formulation of the ﬁrst version of Self-determination is straight-
forward.
Exclusive Self-Determination. For a proﬁle P, let
H = {j |fj(P) = 1}.
If Q is a proﬁle such that Pi,j 6= Qi,j only if i / ∈ H and j ∈ H, then
f(Q) = f(P).
Theorem 2. The Liberal Rule is the only one that satisﬁes the ax-
ioms of Monotonicity, Duality, Independence, and by Exclusive Self-
determination.
For the formulation of Aﬃrmative Self-determination we need to be
able to qualify individuals as deﬁners of Hobbits. For this purpose we
look closer at the working of proﬁles and rules The social proﬁle P,
which we use to deﬁne Hobbits, can be thought of as a binary relation
on the set of individual, where a pair of individuals (i,j) belongs to
this relation if i deﬁnes j as a Hobbit. Individuals play two roles in
this relation: an individual in the ﬁrst place of the relation plays the
role of a deﬁner of Hobbits, and in the second place—the role of one
who is deﬁned as a Hobbit. Being deﬁned as a Hobbit in the proﬁle
requires a deﬁner. The rule f, which constructs from P the group of
Hobbits, generates, in terms of the binary relation, a set of individuals
who play the role of the second place of the relation.
Thus, f can be though of as a rule that generates for any given binary
relation on individuals a subset of them which can be described as
“individuals of the second-place-type.” In particular f can be applied
to the inverse relation: “j is deﬁned by i as a Hobbit”. The role
individuals play in the second place of the inverse relation is that ofBETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 11
deﬁner of Hobbits. Thus, f generates from this binary relation a subset
of individuals who are the deﬁners of Hobbit.
We can now express, in terms of the rule f, the idea that Hobbits
have the right to deﬁne themselves as such. It says that the group of
individuals qualiﬁed as Hobbits and the group of individuals qualiﬁed
as deﬁners of Hobbits are the same. An underlying assumption here is
that the rule f is universally used for all binary relationships on the
set of individuals.
Formally, if the proﬁle P describes a binary relation, then the inverse
relation is described by the transposed matrix P t, where P t
ij = Pji.
Thus, if in the example above, the groups of Hobbits and of deﬁners
of Hobbits are constructed in the same way, then these two groups are
given by f(P) and f(P t), respectively. Aﬃrmative Self-determination
is now stated by,
Aﬃrmative Self-determination. f(P) = f(P t)
Theorem 3. The Liberal Rule is the only one that satisﬁes, Mono-
tonicity, Duality, Independence and Aﬃrmative Self-determination.
4. Discussion
4.1. The Symmetry axiom. In our model a society N is required
to qualify its own individuals. A more general model is one in which
society is required to qualify individuals of some set M, disjoint of
N. A social proﬁle, in this case, would be a matrix P, not necessarily
a square one, where the rows are labeled by individuals in N, and
columns are labeled by individuals in M. All three axioms other than
Symmetry can be stated in the same way, and equally motivated for
the more general case.
The Symmetry axiom is special, though, to our model. In the general
model there are two axioms that are related to Symmetry. First, we
can require Anonymity of the individuals of society. That is, if the
names of the members of N—the qualifying individuals—are permuted,
then the socially qualiﬁed group remains the same. Formally, for any
permutation τ of N, we require that f(τP) = f(P), where (τP)ij =
Pτ(i)j.
Second, we can require neutrality of the qualiﬁed persons, as follows.
Let σ be a permutation of M, and P a proﬁle. Suppose, now, that we
change the proﬁle such that each individual i in the society qualiﬁes j
iﬀ he qualiﬁed σ(j) in P. We require that socially qualiﬁed persons in
the new proﬁle are those obtained by permuting the qualiﬁed persons
in the original proﬁle. Formally, it is required that f(σP) = σf(P),
where (σP)ij = Piσ(j).BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 12
Requiring Anonymity in our model implies the disregarding of the
natural identiﬁcation of society with the set of qualiﬁed individuals. In
particular, the linkage between the individual and the issue to which
her qualiﬁcation is considered becomes socially irrelevant. Among the
Liberal-Democratic Rules only the pure Majority Rule, for odd n, sat-
isﬁes this.
Requiring neutrality, on top of Independence, implies that the same
rule is used by society to determine the qualiﬁcation of each individual.
Again, only the pure Majority Rule, for odd n, satisﬁes this, among all
the Liberal-Democratic Rules.
We conclude, then, that by adding either of these two axioms, or
both, to the four axioms in Theorem 1 results in a unique mechanism,
the Simple Majority Rule, when n is odd, and no possible rule for
even n. Observe also, that these two axioms imply the Symmetry
axiom, and therefore omitting Symmetry and adding Anonymity and
neutrality gives the same characterization as adding both on top of
Symmetry.
4.2. The Independence axiom. In certain social situations the In-
dependence axiom is untenable. Consider for example election of a
committee, of a certain ﬁxed size, from a list of candidates. The list
may consist of all voters, like the model we discuss in this paper. Sup-
pose, moreover, that each individual votes by specifying a subset of
individuals (which are also the candidates). A social rule, in this case,
will be deﬁned exactly as it is deﬁned here, with one diﬀerence. The
range of such a rule should be restricted to subsets of the size of the
committee. In this case the Independence axiom is not reasonable. The
question whether a certain individual should qualify as a member of
the committee should depend not only on what voters think about her,
but also on what they think about others, and how the others compare
to her. A rule for such a problem is approval voting (see Brams and
Fishburn (1978)), in which the elected committee consists of the indi-
viduals with the highest score, where the score of an individual is the
number of voters who includes her in their votes. Obviously, approval
voting does not satisfy Independence.
The Independence axiom is not only unreasonable when such re-
strictions on the range of rules are imposed, it also implies that such
restrictions are impossible. Indeed, the range of a rule that satisﬁes
Independence includes any subset of individuals whose qualiﬁcation
depends on the social proﬁle. Formally,
Proposition 1. Let f be a rule that satisﬁes the axiom of Indepen-
dence. Then, there is a subsets, T of N such that the projection ofBETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 13
the range of f on {0,1}
T is all of it, and for each individual j 6∈ T,
fj(P) is independent of the proﬁle P. If, moreover, the rule f satisﬁes
Symmetry, then its range is either {0,1}
N, or (1,...,1), or (0,...,0).
1
The Independence axiom is inappropriate not only when individuals
should be compared. It is also inconsistent with rules that relegate the
social power to a subset of individuals. Suppose, for example, that the
qualiﬁcation of an individual is socially determined by the way others
view only him, but not all others—only views of individuals who are
unanimously qualiﬁed are counted (see, for example, the rule in the
proof of Theorem 1, that does not satisfy Independence). Here, an
individual’s qualiﬁcation depends on views concerning other individu-
als; such views determine who are the “judges” of qualiﬁcation, and
through them who is qualiﬁed.
4.3. An alternative presentation of Liberal-Democratic Rules.
Consider for each individual j, and each even number e which satisﬁes
0 ≤ e ≤ n, a weighted majority game ve
j. The weight of all individuals
in this game is 1, except for j whose weight is n − e. The quota in
the game is half of the total weight. Obviously, for each coalition S,
at least one of S and its complement is a winning coalition. Since
e is even, the total weight is odd, and therefore only one of the two
coalitions is winning. This enables us to deﬁne a rule ge as follows.
For any proﬁle P and individual j, consider the two complementary
subsets {i | Pij = 0} and {i | Pij = 1}. One, and only one of these
subsets is a winning coalition in ve
j. Now, ge
j(P) is 0 or 1, according to
which one of the two coalitions is winning.
Proposition 2. For each Liberal-Democratic Rule fs, fs = ge(s), where
e(s) is the one to one map of the domain {s | 1 ≤ s ≤ n/2 + 1} onto
{e | e is even,0 ≤ e ≤ n} deﬁned by e(s) = 2s − 2.
4.4. The Liberal Rule and the Liberal Axiom. We assume, now,
that each individual i has a strict preference relation i over subsets
of individuals (or equivalently over {0,1}N). For given preferences of
individuals we can select a subset of individuals by applying the Liberal
1Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) also record a connection between Independence
and restrictions on the range of a rule. They studied models in which the rows of P
and the range of f can be neither (1,...,1) nor (0,...,0). They show that the only
rules that satisfy the axioms of Independence and Consensus are the dictatorial
Rules. The requirement that the range of a rule is full plays an important role in
Barbera et al. (1991) and is called voter sovereignty.BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 14
Rule, f1, to the proﬁle of most preferred subsets. We may ask, now,
whether the Liberal Rule satisﬁes the Liberal Axiom.
Since social alternatives in our model are a special case of those in
Gibbard (1973a), it is most appropriate to consider Gibbard’s version
of the Liberal Axiom. In terms of our setup, a rule f satisﬁes this axiom
when each individual is decisive on certain alternatives as follows. If x
and y are two elements of {0,1}N, such that xj = yj, for each j 6= i,
and i prefers x to y, then f(P) 6= y. As is shown in Gibbard (1973a)
there is no rule, deﬁned over all preference orders, that satisﬁes this
axiom. However, he shows that there are rules that satisfy a Restricted
Liberal Axiom, in which decisiveness of individuals is required only
when preferences are unconditional. Individual i’s preference is said to
be unconditional (for his issue), when for any x and y as above, if i
prefers x to y, then he prefers also x0 to y0, whenever, x0




j for all j 6= i. In terms of subsets this means that if for
some S where i 6∈ S, S ∪ {i} i S, then for all T such that i 6∈ T,
T ∪{i} i T, and if for some S where i 6∈ S, S i S ∪{i}, then for all
T such that i 6∈ T, T i T ∪ {i}.
It is straightforward to see that f1 satisﬁes the Restricted Liberal
Axiom. Moreover, Gibbard’s proof for the existence of a social choice
function that satisﬁes the Restricted Liberal Axiom is carried out by
constructing a function that extends the Liberal Rule to the more gen-
eral case studied in Gibbard (1973a).
4.5. Sincerity. Individual preferences combined with the rule f1 de-
ﬁne a game. We can ask, then, under which conditions will it be an
equilibrium for the individuals to be sincere (as deﬁned by Farquharson
(1969)), i.e., to propose their most preferred subset. It is easy to see
that if an individual’s preference are unconditional, then proposing his
most preferred subset is a dominant strategy. Indeed, an individual’s
proposal determines only whether he belongs to the socially selected
subset of qualiﬁed persons or not. If individual i belongs to her most
preferred set, then by conditionality she prefers to join any subset,
which she achieves by proposing her most preferred subset. The argu-
ment is similar when she does not belong to her most preferred subset.
The model here is a special case of the one in Barbera et al. (1991),
where individuals vote for a subset of a given set K. A preference order
 on subsets of K is called separable, in that work, when for any subset
T and x 6∈ T, T ∪ {x}  T if and only if x is an element of the most
preferable subset. In our model, separability implies unconditionality,
and therefore guarantees that proposing the most preferred subset of
individual is a dominant strategy for f1. It is easy to see also, thatBETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 15
the stronger condition of separability guarantees that truth telling is
dominant for every rule which satisﬁes Monotonicity and Independence
(and hence in all Liberal-Democratic Rules). This is the “easy” part of
the characterization of voting by committees in Barbera et al. (1991).
4.6. The Liberal and the Pareto axioms. As noticed by Gibbard,
even the Restricted Liberal Axiom contradicts Pareto eﬃciency. In-
deed, suppose there are two individuals who have to determine who
reads X. Individual 1 cares foremost for 2’s education: he prefers any
alternative in which 2 reads X to any alternative in which 2 does not.
In the second place, 1 cares for his own education: other things be-
ing equal (i.e., given 2’s behavior) he would rather read X than not.
Similarly, 2 cares foremost for 1’s moral ﬁber, and therefore she prefers
any alternative in which 1 does not read X to any alternative in which
1 does. Likewise, other things being equal she prefers refraining from
reading salacious X. Proposing their most preferred alternatives (1 pro-
poses that both read it, 2—that both do not), the Liberal Rule allows
1 to read X and 2 not to. Yet both prefer that 1 does not read it, and
2 does.
Each individual preference in this case is unconditional for his/her
issue. The reason for the failure of Pareto eﬃciency is due to the
excessive nosiness of the individuals: each individual minds foremost
the other’s business. If we require the opposite, that each individual
cares in the ﬁrst place for his/her issue and only in the second place for
others’, than the Liberal Rule satisﬁes Pareto eﬃciency. We say that i’s
preference is moderately nosy if when i prefers x to y he also prefers x0
to y0, whenever x0
i = xi, and y0
i = yi. When individuals are moderately
nosy, there cannot be an alternative x which is unanimously preferred
to f1(P). Indeed, if x 6= f1(P), then for some j, xj 6= f1
j (P) = Pjj.
As (Pj1,...,Pjn) is the most preferred alternative by j, it follows by
moderate nosiness, that it is also preferred to x.
5. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to see that any Liberal-Democratic
rule satisﬁes Independence. To prove that it satisﬁes Monotonicity,
assume that P ≥ P 0 and let f = fs. Suppose that fj(P) = 1. Then
either Pjj = 1 and |{i | Pij = 1}| ≥ s, or Pjj = 0 and |{i | Pij =
1}| ≥ n − s + 1. If P 0
jj = Pjj then in either case fj(P 0) = 1, since
|{i | P 0
ij = 1}| ≥ |{i | Pij = 1}|. If Pjj = 0 and P 0
jj = 1, then
|{i | P 0
ij = 1}| ≥ n − s + 2 ≥ s and therefore fj(P 0) = 1.
To show that Symmetry holds for f = fs, let π be a permutation of
N. Then, fj(πP) = (πP)jj = Pπ(j)π(j) iﬀ |{i | (πP)ij = (πP)jj}| ≥ s,BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 16
i.e., |{i | Pπ(i)π(j) = Pπ(j)π(j)}| ≥ s. As π is one-to-one, the latter
condition is equivalent to |{π(i) | Pπ(i)π(j) = Pπ(j)π(j)}| ≥ s. But this is
exactly the necessary and suﬃcient condition that fπ(j)(P) = Pπ(j)π(j).
Thus, fj(πP) = fπ(j)(P).
To show that Duality holds, observe that fj(P) = P jj iﬀ |{i | P ij =
P jj}| ≥ s. This inequality is equivalent to |{i | Pij = Pjj}| ≥ s, which
holds iﬀ fj(P) = Pjj, or equivalently fj(P) = P jj.
We now prove that any social rule f that satisﬁes the four axioms is a
Liberal-Democratic Rule. By the Independence axiom, fj(P) depends
only on column j in P. Therefore, for each j there exists a function
hj: {0,1}N → {0,1} such that fj(P) = hj(P1j,...,Pnj). Using the
Duality axiom we conclude,
hj(P 1j,...,P nj) = fj(P) = fj(P) = hj(P1j,...,Pnj).
Hence, for any x ∈ {0,1}N,
hj(x) = hj(x). (1)
From Monotonicity it follows that if P ≥ P 0, then






Thus, hj is monotonic, that is, for x,y ∈ {0,1}N, if x ≥ y, then
hj(x) ≥ hj(y).








Since by the Symmetry axiom, fj(πP) = fπ(j)(P) it follows that,
hj(Pπ(1)π(j),...,Pπ(n)π(j)) = hπ(j)(P1π(j),...,Pnπ(j)). (2)
Assume, now, that π(j) = j. Then, for such a permutation, equation
(2) yields hj(Pπ(1)j,...,Pπ(n)j) = hj(P1j,...,Pnj). Therefore, for any
such permutation, and x ∈ {0,1}N, hj(xπ(1),...,xπ(1)) = hj(x). It fol-





hj(x) = hj(y). Thus, there exists a function gj(a,b), where a ∈ {0,1}
and b ∈ {0,...,n − 1}, such that hj(x) = gj(xj,
P
i6=j xi). Moreover,
by (2), for any permutation π, hj(xπ(1),...,xπ(n)) = hπ(j)(x). But
then gj(xπ(j),
P
i6=j xπ(i)) = gπ(j)(xπ(j),
P
i6=π(j) xi), and this means that
gj = gπ(j). Therefore, we can write g for all gj.
As hj is monotonic, g is monotonic in both arguments. Also, by (1),
g(a,b) + g(1 − a,n − 1 − b) = 1. (3)BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 17
By (3), g can not be identically 0, and therefore, there exist a and
b such that g(a,b)=1. By the monotonicity of g, g(1,b) = 1. Let c be
the ﬁrst integer for which g(1,c) = 1. If c = 0, then the monotonicity
of g implies g(1,·) = 1, and by (3) g(0,·) = 0. If c > 0, then by the
deﬁnition of c, and (3 ),
g(1,c − 1) = 0, g(1,c) = 1,
g(0,n − c) = 1, g(0,n − 1 − c) = 0.
Denote s = c + 1, then g(1,b) = 1 iﬀ 1 + b ≥ s, and g(0,b) = 0 iﬀ
b ≤ n − s. To see that s ≤ n/2 + 1 observe that either s = 1, or else
g(0,n−c) = 1 and by Monotonicity, g(1,n−c) = 1. Hence, n−c ≥ c,
or c ≤ n/2.
Now, fj(P) = g(Pjj,
P
i6=j Pij). When Pjj = 1, then fj(P) = Pjj iﬀ P
i Pij ≥ s iﬀ |{i | Pij = Pjj}| ≥ s. If Pjj = 0, then fj(P) = Pjj iﬀ P
i Pij ≤ n − s, which is equivalent to |{i | Pij = Pjj}| ≥ s. This is
precisely the condition that deﬁnes the Liberal-Democratic Rule with
support size s.
To show that the axioms are independent we describe for each axiom
a rule that does not satisfy the axiom but does satisfy all other axioms.
We omit the detail of the proof.
Monotonicity. Consider the rule deﬁned by f(P) = f1(P), where
f1(P) is the Liberal Rule. Fix individual j. Then, fj(0) = 1, where 0
here is the zero matrix. For P 0 with P 0
jj = 1, P 0 ≥ 0, and fj(P 0) = 0.
Note also that if we deﬁne fs exactly like Liberal-Democratic Rules,
but with s > n/2 + 1, then by the proof of theorem 1, fs satisﬁes all
axioms but Monotonicity.
Duality. Consider the rule which deﬁnes the group of qualiﬁed as
the subset of all individuals that are unanimously qualiﬁed. That is,
f(P) = 1 iﬀ Pij = 1, for all i.
Symmetry. This axiom is obviously violated by dictatorial Rules, like
f(P) = 1 iﬀ P1j = 1.
Independence. Deﬁne f(P) as follows. Let S = {j | Pij = 1, for all i}
and T = {j | Pij = 0, for all i}. The sets S and T consist of the
individuals who are unanimously considered qualiﬁed or unqualiﬁed,
correspondingly. The rule accepts this unanimous verdict. That is, for
each j ∈ S, fj(P) = 1 and for each j ∈ T, fj(P) = 0. Qualiﬁcation
of individuals that are not in S ∪ T is determined by the members of
S∪T as follows. Deﬁne for each j ∈ N \(S∪T), sj = |{i | Pij = 1}∩S|
and tj = |{i | Pij = 0} ∩ T|. If sj > tj then fj(P) = 1; if tj > sj, then
fj(P) = 0. Finally, if sj = tj then j’s qualiﬁcation is determined by
herself, i.e., fj(P) = Pjj.BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 18
Proof of Proposition 1. Let S be the subset of all individuals j
for which fj(P) is independent of P, and let T = N \ S. For every
j ∈ T, there must be proﬁles Qj0 and Qj1 such that fj(Qj0) = 0 and
fj(Qj1) = 1 . Given any x ∈ {0,1}T, construct a proﬁle Q as follows.
For j ∈ T , if xj = 0 , than Qij = Q
j0
ij for all i, and if xj = 1, than
Qij = Q
j1
ij for all i. The rest of Q can be deﬁned arbitrarily. By
Independence, for all j ∈ T, xj = fj(Q).
Suppose that f satisﬁes also the Symmetry axiom. If S = ∅ then
T = N, and the range of f is {0,1}N. Assume, now, that j ∈ S. Then,
fj(P) is independent of P. We show, moreover, that fk(P) = fj(P)
for each k and P, and hence the range of f is either (1,...,1) or
(0,...,0). Indeed, let π be a permutation of N such that π(j) = k.
Then, fj(P) = fj(πP) = fπ(j)(P) = fk(P), where the ﬁrst equality
follows from the deﬁnition of S and the second from Symmetry.
Proof of Theorem 2. As in the previous proof, it is easy to see
that the Liberal Rule satisﬁes the axioms. Assume now that f satisﬁes
the axioms. We show that for any proﬁle P and each individual k,
fk(P) = Pkk. By duality it is enough to consider the case Pkk = 1.
Assume, per absurdum, fk(P) = 0.
For a subset T of N, denote by P T the proﬁle which is the same
as P, except that all individuals in T, qualify k. (i.e., P T
jk = 1 for
j ∈ T, and P T
jl = Pjl when j 6∈ T or l 6= k.) By Duality, Monotonicity,
and Independence, fk(P N) = 1. Let S = {j | Pjk = 1}. Then,
P S = P, and hence fk(P S) = 0. Therefore, by Monotonicity, there
are T and m, such that S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {m}, and fk(P T) = 0, and
fk(P T∪{m}) = 1. Obviously, m 6= k because otherwise, as Pkk = 1,
P T = P T∪{m}. Therefore, by Independence, fm(P T) = fm(P T∪{m}).
If both are 0, then Exclusive Self-determination is contradicted at the
proﬁle P T∪{m}, as k is qualiﬁed in this proﬁle, m is not, and yet m’s
change of vote changes k qualiﬁcation. If they are both 1, then this
axiom is similarly contradicted at the proﬁle P T, by Duality.
Proof of Theorem 3. It is easy to see that the Liberal Rule satisﬁes
the axioms. Assume now that f satisﬁes the axioms. We show that
for any proﬁle P and each individual k, fk(P) = Pkk. By Duality it
is enough to consider the case Pkk = 1. Let Q be a matrix such that
for all i,j, Qik = Pik and Qkj = 1. Denote by 1NxN the matrix of
ones. Then, fk(P) = fk(Q) = fk(Qt) = fk(1NxN) , where the ﬁrst
and last equality hold by Independence, and the second equality holds
by Aﬃrmative Self-determination. Clearly, Duality and Monotonicity
imply that fk(1N×N) = 1.BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 19
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